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The specification, design, and assurance of safety encompasses various concepts and best practices, subject of
reuse in form of patterns. This work summarizes applied research on such concepts and practices with a focus
on the last two decades and on the state-of-the-art of patterns in safety-critical system design and assurance
argumentation. We investigate several aspects of such patterns, for example, where and when they are applied,
their characteristics and purposes, and how they are related. For each aspect, we provide an overview of
relevant studies and synthesize a taxonomy of first principles underlying these patterns. Furthermore, we
comment on how these studies address known challenges and we discuss suggestions for further research.
Our findings disclose a lack of research on how patterns improve system safety claims and, vice versa, on the
decomposition of system safety into separated local concerns, and on the impact of security on safety.
CCS Concepts: • General and reference → Design; Reliability; • Computer systems organization →
Architectures; Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networks; • Hardware → Safety criti-
cal systems; • Software and its engineering→ Software safety; Error handling and recovery; Software
verification and validation; Risk management; • Security and privacy→ Security in hardware.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: System safety, safety engineering, system architecture, design, argument,
assurance case, knowledge reuse, pattern
1 INTRODUCTION
Safety is an indisputably critical and strongly desirable property of engineered systems as operated
in their designated environments [Leveson 2012; McDermid 1991]. The assurance of this property
remains a critical activity throughout the life cycle of such systems. The procedure and the key
elements of safety engineering are reflected in generic and domain-specific methods, techniques,
and standards.
1.1 Background
This section highlights important concepts in safety assurance, introduces the terminology used
below, and summarizes core aspects of design and argument patterns used in safety assurance.
1.1.1 Systems and Safety. Consider an engineered physical system operated in a domestic, urban,
or industrial environment, for example, an autonomous mobile robot carrying through tasks in a
warehouse—for the sake of discussing a recent application domain.
By system safety (safety for short), we refer to the extent to which such a system is free of
hazards, that is, of risks of physical harm for humans, the environment, the system itself, and other
usually physical assets [Burns et al. 1992; Leveson 2012; Lund et al. 2011]. In the robot example,
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such hazards could involve collisions of the robot with obstacles, the robot falling down the stairs,
the robot dumping down valuables, or the robot having an internal component failure or getting
malicious or erroneous control inputs potentially triggering one of the previous risks.
One way of classifying failures is to distinguish systematic from random causes. Systematic
faults are associated with development mistakes leading to wrong specifications, designs, or
implementations. Materials such as, for example, mechanical, electrical, and electronic components
exhibit random faults because of aging, degradation, or electromagnetic radiation. According to a
widespread view, random behavior of software can only result from random inputs or faults in the
electronic hardware the software is running on. We will use the term fault in this study, although
many of the discussions apply to the terms error and failure, that is, undesired higher-level or
downstream events caused by faults [Avizienis et al. 2004; Laprie 1992].
Overall, system safety is about handling critical events and their possible undesired consequences.
Risk analysis as one step towards handling such events deals with the estimation of risk levels (also:
risk priority) of these events, that is, abstractions of the expected loss or cost resulting from these
events. Domain-specific risk classifiers (also: risk matrices) help safety analysts to rank risks usually
by estimating and combining two parameters, probability of occurrence and severity of consequence.
In regulations (e.g. in the United Kingdom and in Australia), an engineered system is considered
safe if all relevant risks have been reduced to a tolerable level, that is, a level at which the cost of
further risk reduction measures would be grossly disproportionate to their benefit.
1.1.2 Engineering Steps. The robot example indicates the many dimensions of system safety and
its tight relationship to other disciplines, for example, IT security. Safety assurance considers the
whole life cycle of a system (i.e., the system as specified, designed, implemented, operated, and
decommissioned) as the primary source, root cause, or amplifier of such risk and as the subject of
assurance. The system as operated is the most tangible assurance object.
In a typical life cycle, we distinguish the engineering steps of specification, design, implemen-
tation, and assurance. The left part of Figure 1 depicts the artifacts crafted in these steps. For
specification, the artifact “specification” is crafted by the activity “requirements engineering.”
For design, the artifact “system design” is crafted by the corresponding “software and systems
engineering” activity. We distinguish two main abstractions used to model designs: behavior and
decomposition. Implementation can be seen as a revision and refinement of what is already there:
the design. The right part of Figure 1 depicts the facets of assurance (blue arcs). These facets
usually comprise
• meeting the safety specification by guaranteeing reachability and invariance (the refines-arc),
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Fig. 1. Assurance of system safety: core artifacts and their relationships
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• fault-avoidance and fault-tolerance (the transformation-arc to “enhanced decomposition,”
“safe behavior,” and “safety specification,” driven by system-level hazard analysis),
• guidance from standards (all blue arcs),
• case-based argumentation from verification, validation, and testing (all blue arcs).
Figure 1 describes assurance as the argument (blue arcs) that a consistently safety-enhanced
implementation is a refinement of a consistently safety-enhanced design which itself is a refinement
of a consistent safety specification.
1.1.3 Patterns, Pattern Categories, Abstraction, and Tactics. Models used in engineering—such as
specifications, architectures, or designs—are, if they address a common problem, candidates for
reuse [Kramer 2007]. We refer to such abstractions as patterns. In this work, design and argument
patterns denote general solutions for common problems recurring in the construction and assurance
practice of safety-critical systems.
The effective reusability of a pattern depends on the quality of its documentation. In civil archi-
tecture [Alexander et al. 1977] and later in software engineering [Gamma et al. 1993], researchers
started to extract patterns from various sources and to catalog them using templates and models.
Templates help in collecting general information from the recurrences of a pattern such as, for
example, the context of use, the problem addressed, the solution, the consequences of use, given
names, underlying principles. Models are useful to capture technical details with a more expressive
language (e.g. temporal logic, labeled transition system) and a standard notation (e.g. the Unified
Modeling Language or the Goal Structuring Notation).1
Based on the artifacts and relationships in Figure 1, we distinguish the following categories of
patterns:
Specifications reflect practices to specify (e.g. using domain-specific language [Dwyer et al.
1999]) and decompose (e.g. using contracts [Meyer 1992]) safety requirements. Contracts
form a practical way of including assumptions about the environment of a system into
a specification. For example, van Lamsweerde [2009] provides a framework to construct
specifications based on this idea.
Designs comprise two interrelated abstractions: (interface) behavior and (architectural) de-
composition.
Behaviors describe safety concepts expressed in terms of a behavior model, for example, a
state machine encoding how a specific system is controlled to efficiently leave a dangerous
situation or to enter a safe state. If such behaviors are expressed with respect to the overall
system—sharing the interface with the assets to be protected in the environment—then a
corresponding contract can be formulated.
Decompositions represent reusable design practices to increase safety. Such practices range
from cross-disciplinary or mechatronic architecture design to implementation in software,
electronic, and mechanical hardware. Common across these technologies is a particular
decomposition to implement principles such as, for example, monitoring, fault detection,
redundancy, or recovery [Knight 2012]. Such principles reduce the range of choices for
design decisions and are also known as architectural tactics [Wu and Kelly 2004].
Procedures deal with the steps of the engineering process required to perform safety design
and assurance.
Transformations cover the work steps of creating and changing engineering artifacts, for
example, the hardening of an architecture, the corresponding update of a fault tree, or the
refinement of a specification.
1See http://www.omg.org.
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Arguments cover analysis and assessment practices to justify an acceptable level of safety
of the considered system in a specific operational environment [Kelly and McDermid 1998;
McDermid 1994]. Such arguments are used to establish claims, for example, of the form
“System S is free of hazard H ,” “Development process of system S complies with standard
X ,” or “Argument A is sufficiently confident.” The first one is also called a product-based
argument (e.g. constructed during formal verification), the second one is a process-based
argument (in this case, a compliance argument), and the third one is a meta-argument (in
this case, a confidence argument). Luo et al. [2016] provide a corresponding taxonomy.
Such patterns reoccur in many of the collaborating branches of safety engineering. They are also
part of widely used standards (e.g. IEC 61508) and have received frequent attention in the scientific
literature.
1.1.4 Terminology. Subtle differences between a specification and a specification pattern or be-
tween an argument and an argument pattern are not essential for this survey. However, reusable
specifications and arguments should be documented along with certain abstractions such as, for
example, type parameters, variation or extension points. This survey is not about general software
and hardware patterns. For the sake of simplicity, we treat the terms hazard and (safety) risk
as synonyms. Furthermore, we treat safety cases, or in general, assurance cases as synonyms to
assurance arguments. However, an argument is to be viewed distinctly from its representation, for
example, a goal structure that visualizes the argument. According to Hoare [1985], we view an
implementation as a final and executable refinement of a corresponding specification.
1.1.5 From Designs to Specifications. Depending on the regulated domain, the engineering disci-
pline, and the level of abstraction, an enhancement leading to a safety-enhanced design (Figure 1)
is called “risk reduction measure” [IEC 61508], “safety function,” “safety measure,” “safety pat-
tern” [Preschern et al. 2013a], “safety mechanism,” “safety-related system” [IEC 61508], “safety-
related function or element” [ISO 26262], “safety-critical system” [Knight 2012], or “critical (com-
puter) system” [Rushby 1994]. Rushby and Knight adhere to the safety engineering tradition for
the description of these terms:
“[A] critical (computer) system is a system whose malfunction could lead to
unacceptable consequences.” / “[A] safety-critical system is a system whose
consequences of failure are extremely serious.”
These terms suggest that only those systems that fail could engage in undesired events. However,
for example, a mobile robot’s behavior may well cause loss of life without failure of its components,
for instance, if the robot lacks functionality to stop early for moving obstacles.2 The definition of
“safety-critical service” used by Burns et al. [1992] accommodates this idea:
“[A] service is judged to be safety-critical in a given context if its behavior could be
sufficient to cause absolute harm to resources for which the enterprise operating
the service has responsibility.”
Leveson [2012] elaborates the idea of backwards reasoning from accidents over hazards towards
unsafe control actions. Design choices would then depend on whether such actions represent
random or systematic faults. Her approach allows to focus on the system as operated in its context
able to engage in dangerous events (i.e., accidents) whether or not these events are caused by
component failure. This way, Leveson supports the view of safety as a property emerging from
properties of elements of both the system and its environment. Given a system decomposition,
2It now depends whether or not one counts a missing feature as a systematic fault. Clearly, the robot in this example would
of course no more comply with the state of the art.
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safety can be rephrased into a composite of component properties. Rushby [1994] discusses critical
properties from several viewpoints. We will revisit these kinds of properties below.
Common to such properties is that their meanings depend on the perimeter, scope, boundary,
or interface and the chosen abstraction they are specified for. For hazard analysis, this perimeter
is usually congruent with the overall system. Consequently, a system safety property specifies
behavior at the system level.
1.1.6 Relationships between Patterns. The thick blue arcs in Figure 1 depict three desirable rela-
tionships among patterns of the mentioned categories:
Compositions and Behaviors express Designs Figure 1 already suggests that we take the
view of a design having a behavioral and a structural facet (e.g. [Broy 2011]). Both facets can
be expressed in models. If both models are given, we expect them to be consistent.
Arguments and Transformations express Procedures Arguments capture reasoning steps
from assurance evidence (e.g. proofs, validation reports, test verdicts) towards assurance
claims (e.g. safety specifications). Transformations capture engineering steps. We view ar-
guments and transformations as procedures inasmuch as they incorporate work steps (i.e.,
reasoning and construction steps) to be accomplished by engineers.
Behaviors refine Specifications If a system design is given in terms of a behavior, we want it
to fulfill the corresponding safety specification, in other words, we want it to be a refinement
of this specification.
Compositions refine Behaviors refine Specifications If a system design is given in terms
of an architecture, a particular decomposition into components, two relationships are de-
sirable: First, if a behavior is explicitly given, the behavior emerging from the composition
should be consistent with (possibly, a refinement of) the explicitly given behavior. Second,
this composition should be refinement of the corresponding safety specification. Broy [2011]
gives a more comprehensive formal account of these relationships.
After transforming a composition into another composition enhanced by principles such as,
for example, recovery (see, e.g. [Randell 1975]), we desire that the mentioned relationships
are maintained or established.
1.1.7 Between Specifications and Arguments. Given a specification and a design according to the
left part of Figure 1, safety engineers are interested in arguments for two claims and measures if no
arguments can be found for the current versions of the artifacts (right part of Figure 1):
The specification does not imply relevant hazards.
If no argument can be found, the specification has to be transformed into a safety specification
ruling out all relevant hazards. A safety specification typically includes invariants requiring the
system to stay within safe regions (see, e.g. [Leveson 2012; Rushby 1994]). Such transformations
can require the construction of a design as discussed next.
The design is safe.
This claim can be rephrased into the claim that the design is a refinement of the safety specification.
Such a refinement holds if and only if the weakest precondition for the design to fulfill the safety
specification is different from false. However, if no such argument can be found, the design has to be
transformed into a safety-enhanced design. This transformation has to be consistently performed
if the design is given in terms of both artifacts.
1.1.8 Between Specifications and Behaviors. The behavioral perspective gives rise to behavioral
tactics such as prevention or active safety, passive safety, and fail-safe (e.g. [Knight 2012]). The latter
represents the transition of a system to a safe state in the event of failure. The fail-safe tactic can be
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divided into the fail-silent tactic (i.e., transition to a safe state by excluding failing components from
the system functionality) and the fail-operational tactic (i.e., transition to a safe state maintaining
the original system functionality).
For any system and for each of its components, we can specify dependability and security
properties [Avizienis et al. 2004; Laprie 1992]. As mentioned before, safety can be seen as a property
emerging from a system or to be entailed by the compound behavior of its components. This
phenomenon can be investigated using formal notions of properties such as, for example, safety,
liveness, reliability, and availability.
Lamport [1977] formally discusses two distinct behavioral properties of systems:
• Safety properties state that something bad will never happen.
• Liveness properties state that something good will eventually happen.
Alpern and Schneider [1987] show that all behavioral properties can be decomposed into a safety
and a liveness part with the obligation to proof invariance for safety and well-foundedness for
liveness of a specific system. In concurrent systems with constrained resources, one also needs to
prove fairness properties, that is, the property that each of a set of components will infinitely often
be able to be productive if they wish to do so. Hence, fairness is a special form of liveness.
Avizienis et al. [2004] qualitatively characterize reliability as the “continuity of correct service.”
Knight [2012] and Bertsche et al. [2009] use two related definitions of reliability: the “probability
that the system will operate correctly [...] up until time t” and the “mean time to the first (between
two) failure(s).” One can rephrase the latter into the following requirement:
The mean number of steps of system S to the first “bad thing” (between two “bad
things”) is greater than n.
If we substitute “mean” by “minimum” and let n = ∞, we get a safety property. The strength or
weakness of a property corresponds to the strength or weakness of its proof obligations. Hence,
the requirement above suggests that proof obligations for reliability requirements are in general
weaker than proof obligations for formal safety properties. Consequently, reliability properties are
in general weaker than safety properties.
Although we can find qualitative abstractions of probabilistic phenomena, reliability practitioners
are usually interested in the quantitative assessment of a system, particularly, in uncertainty factors
of technologies (e.g. material degradation and electromagnetic interference causing random failures)
and development processes (e.g. developer mistakes causing systematic failures). For example,
Littlewood and Rushby [2012] discuss stochastic process models to calculate the probability of failure
on demand of a systemwith a specific form of diverse redundancy. Further reliability and availability
metrics include, for example, mean time between failure. Software defects can be considered as
systematic if they are deployed in the system as operated. Hence, Littlewood [1991] use stochastic
process models to predict the probability of development defects occurring during system use.
The introduced reliability definitions indicate the difference between non-repairable and repairable
systems. Repairable systems give rise to the discussion of availability, that is, “the probability that
the system will be operational at time t” [Knight 2012, 2.7.2] or its complement, the probability
of failure on demand. From Lamport’s perspective, a repairable system with non-zero availability
would fulfill the two liveness properties “not always bad” and “always eventually good.”
Let us now look at the relationship of safety and security: Avizienis et al. [2004] define security
as a composite of integrity (i.e., the absence of unauthorized influence), confidentiality (i.e., the
absence of unauthorized access), and availability on demand of authorized actions. Unauthorized
actions are the “bad things” that have to be reduced, or avoided if seen as a formal safety property.
Burns et al. [1992] distinguish between an absolute and a relative “degree of harm” (also “severity
of consequence”) to discriminate between safety (absolute harm) and security (relative harm):
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“[A] service is judged to be security-critical in a given context if its behavior could
be sufficient to cause relative harm, but never sufficient to cause absolute harm,
to resources for which the enterprise operating the service has responsibility.”
The notions of Burns et al. [1992] and Avizienis et al. [2004] can be unified by a common principle:
The protection of an asset from an undesired event caused by an agent.
Proving the avoidance of the undesired event for a system amounts to proving a formal safety
property of this system. For security, the assets would be represented by “information” or “method
calls”, the undesired event by “unauthorized access or influence through exploiting vulnerabilities,”
and the agent by an “attacker.” For safety, the assets would be represented by “humans”, “animals”,
or “the environment,” the undesired event by “getting harmed”, and the agent by “the system under
consideration.” Below, we assume that designs can be specified with the discussed properties.
1.2 Objective of this Survey
We are interested in the characteristics of safety patterns and their variety across several disciplines
involved in safety engineering such as, for example, software engineering, mechatronics, electrical
engineering, mechanical engineering, and human factors engineering. With this survey, we aim at
answering the question:
What is the state-of-the-art of design and argument patterns for the assurance of
system safety?
Table 1 decomposes this question into twelve survey questions. By answering these questions, we
aim at understanding various aspects of patterns, the relationships between these patterns, their
properties and composition, and the relationships to their first principles.
1.3 Preliminary Work and Survey Method
For this survey, we first explored the field by an annotated bibliography according to Knott [2015].
Intermediate results are reported in [Gleirscher and Kugele 2016].
Table 1. Overview of the survey questions
Aspect Question Expected Answer Section
qApplication Which applications are discussed in the
studies to demonstrate the patterns?
An overview of relevant studies by application domain 2.1
qMitigated Risk Which types of risk are handled by the
discussed patterns?
An overview of relevant studies by class and causal origin
of risk
2.2
qEngineering Step Which engineering steps are covered by
the studies?
A classification into the categories: specification, design, im-
plementation, assurance
2.3
qCategory Which categories of patterns are pre-
sented?
A classification into the categories: specification, behavior,
decomposition, procedure, transformation, argument
2.4
qPattern Which patterns are discussed? An overview of the explained or applied patterns 2.5
qAbstraction Which technologies are abstracted by
the patterns?
A classification into the categories: software, electri-
cal/electronic hardware, mechanical hardware
2.6
qTactic Which tactics are incorporated by the
patterns?
A summary of the tactics covered according to the tax-
onomies in [Preschern et al. 2013c] and [Wu and Kelly 2004]
2.7
qRelationship How are the patterns and tactics related
to each other?
An analysis based on the results of qCategory, qPattern,
qTactic
2.8
qContract Which behaviors are guaranteed by the
patterns?
A summary of the system-level behaviors associated with
the incorporated safety principles
2.9
qSecurity How is security addressed in the stud-
ies?
A summary of how security is considered in the studies 2.10
qModel Which models are used to describe the
patterns?
An analysis and summary of the modeling paradigms, for-
malisms, and notations
2.11
qContribution To what extent are known challenges
covered by the studies?
A coverage analysis based on challenges from Cant [2013];
Graydon [2015, 2017]; Langari and Maibaum [2013]
2.12
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For a more comprehensive overview of literature on safety patterns and to determine research
directions, we created a systematic map along the lines of Petersen et al. [2008]. We selected the
most relevant studies by summed ranking of relevance. For each selected study, we answered
the survey questions in Section 1.2. Some questions (e.g. qTactic) involved qualitative content
analysis [Neuendorf 2016], that is, content abstraction by assignment of keywords to the studies
and further analysis based on these keywords.
1.4 Related Work
In this section, we summarize literature studies on design and argument patterns and studies of
corresponding pattern taxonomies.
Literature Studies and Pattern Catalogs. Preschern et al. [2014b] discuss twelve safety-related
pattern-based methods regarding their target domain, the involved types of patterns (i.e., process,
safety tactics, architecture, timing), and the degree of detail. Their focus lies on pattern application
and use in the safety process. The authors state that they could not find a similar study on safety
patterns and their application. We complement their study with an extended analysis of pattern
types and relationships.
Luo et al. [2016] discuss a taxonomy of safety cases to map literature on argument patterns
and to establish a similarity relation among safety cases. In their work, four argument types are
distinguished: product-based arguments, process-based arguments, compliance arguments, and
confidence arguments. The authors observe a lack of research on confidence arguments. Our work
extends and embeds their survey into a larger context. Moreover, we use their taxonomy below (cf.
Table 6 in Section 2.5).
Szczygielska and Jarzebowicz [2017] present an on-line argument pattern catalog extracted from
literature on argument patterns. 45 patterns were modeled and can be instantiated from this catalog
during the construction of specific assurance cases. While their catalog exceeds the list of patterns
we discuss in Table 6, our contribution lies in establishing relationships among arguments and
between arguments and designs.
Langari and Maibaum [2013] summarize challenges to be addressed by research on assurance
cases and to be taken into account in future standards and regulations recommending assurance
cases. These challenges include the identification of fallacious reasoning in arguments (e.g. confir-
mation bias), argument completeness, the specification of assumptions, the reduction of argument
size and complexity, and the achievement of readability. We extend Langari and Maibaum’s work
by identifying further research to solving these challenges. We explore the state of the art, how far
research has come in addressing such challenges, as well as interesting research gaps.
Havârneanu et al. [2015] summarize behavioral safety tactics resulting from accident research
in the railway domain, viewing railways as a socio-technical system [Leveson 2012]. The authors
summarize measures for the prevention of trespass accidents, for example, barriers, organizational
measures, monitoring, enforcement, track design, staff training, station lighting, and rail traffic
management. Our study takes an engineering perspective on designs and arguments and, moreover,
abstracts from prevention measures of a specific domain.
Kakamanshadi et al. [2015] summarize research on fault-tolerance mechanisms for resilient and
reliable wireless sensor networks. These mechanisms are based on redundancy of nodes, paths,
data, and time; on clustering to reduce performance bottlenecks, and on optimal deployment.
Taking a more general view, our survey can help to bridge the gap between network reliability and
performance and the concepts required in safety-critical applications relying on such networks.
Tactic Taxonomies. Kumar and Prabhakar [2010] provide a framework for developing taxonomies
such as the ones for safety patterns discussed by Wu and Kelly [2004] and Preschern et al. [2013a].
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Ryoo et al. [2012] describe the extraction and revision of tactic hierarchies for the consolidation of
pattern catalogs. Their application to security tactics provides insight on how safety and security
patterns could be aligned on a tactics level. Hawkins and Kelly [2012] show guidance on the
construction of safety arguments, enumerating principles helpful for the choice of argument
patterns. Our analyses in the Sections 2.5 and 2.7 are based on these works.
1.5 Contributions and Outline
We present a survey of reusable concepts for the specification, design, and assurance of safety-
critical systems. Based on the survey questions presented in Table 1, we classify a range of studies
of such concepts by their application domains, type of mitigated risk, the supported engineering
steps, their first principles, and their abstractions. From a cross-disciplinary perspective, this survey
provides information
• to identify relevant contributions to this field,
• about the range of safety-enhanced designs and assurance arguments,
• to develop a unified view of reusable designs and arguments, and
• to identify directions for further research.
With this study, we contribute to the consolidation of the practical safety engineering body of
knowledge. Based on preliminary materials in [Gleirscher and Kugele 2016] and on the systematic
map according to [Petersen et al. 2008] (Section 1.3), this survey forms a systematic literature review
according to Kitchenham [2007].
The rest of this work is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the answers to the survey ques-
tions. Section 3 discusses these answers, derives recommendations for future research (Section 3),
and discloses limitations of our study (Section 3.8). We draw final conclusions in Section 4.
2 ASPECTS OF DESIGN AND ARGUMENT PATTERNS FOR SAFETY ASSURANCE
The following sections provide answers to the survey questions as introduced in Table 1.
2.1 qApplication: Which applications are discussed to demonstrate the patterns?
Table 2 lists the most relevant studies by application domain. The surveyed studies cover application
domains such as, for example, process plants, machinery, automotive, and avionic systems. Many
studies present generically applicable patterns. Across the mentioned domains, our survey focuses
on pattern applications for the design and assurance of embedded control systems and distributed
systems.
2.2 qMitigated Risk: Which types of risk are handled by the discussed patterns?
Table 3 is organized according to frequently discussed types of risk including its causal origin or
location of occurrence. The surveyed studies deal with the reduction of various technical defects and
the reduction of complexity. The presented approaches handle such risks by measures built from
several technologies (i.e., software, electronic hardware, mechanical hardware). The investigations
deal with risks stemming, for example, from the system as a whole, purely from software, purely
from hardware, from requirements and system design, from arguments, from undesired interference.
2.3 qEngineering Step: Which engineering steps are covered by the studies?
In Section 1.1.2, we distinguish the four engineering steps of specification, design, implementation,
and assurance. Most of our work focuses on studies allocated to the design and assurance steps of
this process. Several studies cover at least three steps and describe the transitions between them.
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Table 2. qApplication: Selection of studies by application domain
Application Domain Selection of Studies
Aircraft & avionics [Basir 2010; Delange et al. 2009; Delmas et al. 2015, 2017; Denney and Pai 2013b; Dias and
Iyoda 2011; Gobbo and Mili 2001; Kehren et al. 2004; Kelly 2006; Littlewood and Rushby 2012;
Lopez-Jaquero et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2009; Mueller and D’Andrea 2012; Netkachova et al.
2015; Steiner and Rushby 2011; Zeng et al. 2016]
Automotive [Antonino and Trapp 2014; da Penha et al. 2015; Dardar et al. 2012; de Oliveira et al. 2015;
Domis et al. 2009; Ebnenasir and Cheng 2007; Gallina 2014; Hocking et al. 2014; Konrad et al.
2004; Lin et al. 2016; Luo et al. 2017a; Martorell et al. 2016; Nasser et al. 2017; Oertel et al. 2014;
Owda and Obermaisser 2015; Palin and Habli 2010; Pont 2003; Rupanov et al. 2012; Sljivo et al.
2015; Standish et al. 2014; Trindade et al. 2014; Wagner et al. 2010; Wu and Kelly 2004]
Machinery & railway [Eloranta and Koskinen 2010; Gleirscher and Carlan 2017; Hauge and Stølen 2013;
Havârneanu et al. 2015; Orlic 2007; Preschern et al. 2013b; Radermacher et al. 2013; Sljivo et al.
2017; Tan et al. 2009]
Medical & other
devices; healthcare
[Fayad et al. 2003; Lakhani and Pont 2012; Lin and Shen 2015; Murugesan et al. 2015; Pont and
Banner 2004; Preschern et al. 2014a; Sun 2014; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2015]
Networks &
telecommunication
[Giuntini et al. 2017; Petroulakis et al. 2016; Saridakis 2002, 2003]
Process & power plants [Larrucea et al. 2017, 2016; Mahemoff et al. 2001; Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2015; Rauhamäki
et al. 2012; Wilson 1992]
Generic [Alho and Rauhamäki 2011; Armoush 2010; Armoush et al. 2008a,b, 2009; Baleani et al. 2003;
Bozzano et al. 2013; Chen and May 2016; Crenshaw et al. 2006; Denney and Pai 2013a;
Grunske 2003; Habli and Kelly 2010; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2008; Islam and Devarakonda
1996; Kabir and Goswami 2015; Kelly and McDermid 1998; Knight 2012; Liu et al. 2008; Luo
et al. 2016; Mayo 2006; Natarajan et al. 2000; Preschern et al. 2014b, 2013a,c; Randell 1975;
Weaver 2003]
Two studies bridge the gap between specification and implementation: Oertel et al. [2014] note
that conventional arguments that an implementation fulfills a safety specification are often based
on matching fault trees and test results with this specification. The authors employ fault-injection
and model checking against safety contracts and, this way, cover the four considered engineering
steps. Trindade et al. [2014] show how formalized safety requirements help transforming a system
design into a new design enhanced with safety mechanisms.
Several studies discuss the transition from specification over design to assurance: Gobbo and Mili
[2001] describe a refinement-based approach to deriving fault-tolerant specifications of flight control
systems. Assurance is achieved by maintaining relational refinement across specification and design
steps. Knight [2012, Ch. 6 and 11] provides a comprehensive treatment of the specification, design,
and assurance steps of the software dependability life cycle. Particularly, he discusses designs (e.g. N-
modular redundancy) reducing the negative impact of degradation faults on software dependability,
designs (e.g. recovery blocks) and procedures (e.g. N-version programming) for improving software
fault-tolerance, and the creation of rigorous arguments. Further discussions that relate specification,
design, and assurance are provided by Antonino and Trapp [2014], Cimatti et al. [2015], Domis
et al. [2009], Hauge and Stølen [2013], Sorokos et al. [2016], Wilson [1992], and Wu et al. [2013].
2.4 qCategory: Which categories of patterns are presented?
Among the categories introduced in Section 1.1.3, our work concentrates on designs and arguments.
However, more than half of the studies cover at least two of the considered categories. Table 4 lists
studies representing these categories.
Assurance of System Safety: Designs and Arguments 11
Table 3. qMitigated Risk: Selection of studies by type and causal origin of risk
Risk Class Selection of Studies
Specification & design
defects (systematic)
[Konrad et al. 2004; Mahemoff et al. 2001; Miller et al. 2009; Sljivo et al. 2015]
Behavioral hazards &
accidents
[Havârneanu et al. 2015; Lin and Shen 2015; Murugesan et al. 2015; Napolano et al. 2015;
Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2014; Riera et al. 2014; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2009]
Generic technical
defects (mainly
random, in hardware)
[Armoush 2010; Armoush et al. 2008a; Baleani et al. 2003; Chen and May 2016; Delmas et al.
2017; Grunske 2003; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2008; Kehren et al. 2004; Knight 2012;
Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Mueller and D’Andrea 2012; Orlic 2007; Preschern et al. 2014b,
2013a,c; Randell 1975; Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2015; Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Saridakis 2002;
Tan et al. 2015]
High complexity [Ebnenasir and Cheng 2007; Jackson 2001; Kelly 2006; Kelly and McDermid 1998; Lakhani and
Pont 2012; Larrucea et al. 2017; Lin et al. 2016; Ljungkrantz et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2016;
Martorell et al. 2016; Miller et al. 2009; Palin and Habli 2010; Pont 2001; Radermacher et al.
2013; Sljivo et al. 2017; Sorokos et al. 2016]
Undesired interference
& mixed criticality
[Althammer et al. 2008; Kehren et al. 2004; Larrucea et al. 2017, 2016, 2015; Netkachova et al.
2015; Orlic 2007; Owda and Obermaisser 2015; Rauhamäki et al. 2013; Tan et al. 2015]
Security threats [Castellanos et al. 2013; Cimatti et al. 2015; Nasser et al. 2017; Netkachova et al. 2015;
Petroulakis et al. 2016; Preschern et al. 2013b]
Argument flaws [Gleirscher and Carlan 2017; Mayo 2006; Rich et al. 2007; Standish et al. 2014]
At system-level (from
several technologies)
[Armoush 2010; Baleani et al. 2003; Crenshaw et al. 2006; Delmas et al. 2017; Fayad et al. 2003;
Gleirscher and Carlan 2017; Gobbo and Mili 2001; Grunske 2003; Kehren et al. 2004; Knight
2012; Lin and Shen 2015; Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Lopez-Jaquero et al. 2012; Luo et al.
2016; Mueller and D’Andrea 2012; Nasser et al. 2017; Preschern et al. 2014b, 2013a,b,c; Randell
1975; Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2015; Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Sun 2014; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al.
2009; Zeng et al. 2016]
Purely from software [Armoush et al. 2008a,b; Chen and May 2016; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2008; Natarajan et al.
2000; Pont and Banner 2004; Saridakis 2002]
Purely from hardware [Delmas et al. 2015; Giuntini et al. 2017; Islam and Devarakonda 1996; Kabir and Goswami
2015; Luo et al. 2017a; Petroulakis et al. 2016; Steiner and Rushby 2011]
We found two works that cover four of the categories. Kehren et al. [2004] present a state-
machine based approach to the generic modeling of safety functions for the refinement of a class of
component architectures. They discuss the automatic proof of properties of these functions and, by
refinement, of all architectures enhanced by these functions, using a linear temporal logic model
checker. The authors demonstrate their method with an architecture using cold redundancy. Domis
et al. [2009] show a concept for achieving traceability of safety information (i.e., argumentation
evidence) throughout a component-based safety engineering life cycle. Component fault trees
derived from hazard analysis provide the core structure for deriving safety requirements (e.g. by
hazard negation) and for constructing the safety argument by modifying the original fault trees.
This approach is exemplified by integrating a safety limiter into an automotive braking controller.
Notable are also the following studies covering three of the categories: Using a railway interlocking
system as an example, Hauge and Stølen [2013] explain a method for the systematic development
of safety concepts. For demonstration, the authors describe the integration of redundancy into this
system. During typical safety engineering steps (i.e., elicit functional requirements, elicit safety
requirements, establish design basis, establish safety case), appropriate safety patterns are selected,
instantiated, and composed. The patterns instantiated throughout these steps are then synthesized
into a “composite pattern solution.” Given a library of safety mechanisms and a software safety
requirement, Trindade et al. [2014] show how a given software implementation can be automatically
enhanced by a safety mechanism such that the safety requirement is fulfilled. To increase the level
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Table 4. qCategory: Selections of studies by pattern category
Category Selection of Studies
Specification Basir [2010]; Gobbo and Mili [2001]; Jackson [2001]; Kajtazovic et al. [2014]; Kehren et al. [2004];
Konrad et al. [2004]; Oertel et al. [2014]; Sljivo et al. [2015]; Trindade et al. [2014]
Behavior Baleani et al. [2003]; Basir [2010]; Belli and Großpietsch [1991]; Crenshaw et al. [2006]; Havârneanu
et al. [2015]; Mahemoff et al. [2001]; Mueller and D’Andrea [2012]; Palin and Habli [2010]; Rauhamäki
and Kuikka [2015]; Rauhamäki et al. [2012]; Sun et al. [2010]; Tan et al. [2009]
Decomposition Armoush [2010]; Armoush et al. [2008a]; Baleani et al. [2003]; Chen and May [2016]; Crenshaw et al.
[2006]; Delange et al. [2009]; Delmas et al. [2017]; Dias and Iyoda [2011]; Domis et al. [2009]; Grunske
[2003]; Iliasov and Romanovsky [2008]; Kehren et al. [2004]; Knight [2012]; Littlewood and Rushby
[2012]; Liu et al. [2008]; Miller et al. [2009]; Mueller and D’Andrea [2012]; Orlic [2007]; Pont and
Banner [2004]; Preschern et al. [2014b, 2013a,b,c]; Randell [1975]; Rauhamäki and Kuikka [2015];
Rauhamäki et al. [2012]; Saridakis [2002]; Sun et al. [2010]; Tan et al. [2015]; Trindade et al. [2014];
Wu and Kelly [2004]
Transformation Castellanos et al. [2013]; Delmas et al. [2015, 2017]; Domis et al. [2009]; Getir et al. [2018]; Grunske
[2003]; Kehren et al. [2004]; Sljivo et al. [2017]; Trindade et al. [2014]
Argument Basir [2010]; Bozzano et al. [2013]; Chen and May [2016]; Dardar et al. [2012]; Denney and Pai
[2013a,b]; Domis et al. [2009]; Gleirscher and Carlan [2017]; Habli and Kelly [2010]; Kelly [2006];
Kelly and McDermid [1998]; Knight [2012]; Larrucea et al. [2016]; Lin and Shen [2015]; Luo et al.
[2016]; Mayo [2006]; Netkachova et al. [2015]; Palin and Habli [2010]; Preschern et al. [2013a]; Sljivo
et al. [2017]; Sun et al. [2010]; Weaver [2003]; Wu and Kelly [2004]
Procedure Bozzano et al. [2013]; Denney and Pai [2013b]; Domis et al. [2009]; Kehren et al. [2004]; Kelly [2006];
Lin and Shen [2015]; Mayo [2006]; Netkachova et al. [2015]; Palin and Habli [2010]; Preschern et al.
[2014b]
of reuse in safety-critical systems engineering, Kajtazovic et al. [2014] propose a structure for a
safety pattern database using contract methodology [Meyer 1992].
Several studies bridge the gap between two categories: Gobbo and Mili [2001] show how require-
ments specifications can be formally refined into conceptual designs. For safety-related design
tactics, Grunske [2003] presents a catalog of architectural transformations with the goal of hard-
ening software architectures according to these tactics. Given an architectural decomposition,
Delmas et al. [2015, 2017] automate the identification of enhancements of this decomposition to
meet safety requirements. Along the lines of Kehren et al. [2004], these enhancements incorporate
design principles (e.g. redundancy) used for “hardening” of an architecture. The authors identify
parameters forming a design space and use SMT solvers to find best solutions to the corresponding
constraint satisfaction problem. Similar to the approach of Domis et al. [2009], Getir et al. [2018]
demonstrate how corresponding architecture/fault-tree pairs can be automatically co-evolved—for a
specific set of modeling operations—using coupled model transformations. Getir et al.’s approach
can be combined with transformations for architecture hardening as discussed by Grunske [2003].
The relationship between specifications and arguments (Section 1.1.6) is discussed in [Antonino
and Trapp 2014; Basir 2010; Jaradat and Bate 2015; Kajtazovic et al. 2014; Kotonya and Sommerville
1997; Sljivo et al. 2015]. Both aspects of designs, behaviors and decompositions, receive a treatment
in the works of Mahemoff et al. [2001]; Mueller and D’Andrea [2012]; Rauhamäki and Kuikka
[2015]; Rauhamäki et al. [2012]; Sun et al. [2010]. The transition between a system decomposition
and the construction of a safety argument is taken account of by Chen and May [2016]; Knight
[2012]; Larrucea et al. [2016]; Netkachova et al. [2015]; Preschern et al. [2013a]; Sun et al. [2010];
Wu and Kelly [2004]. Several authors discuss both arguments and procedures in a reusable context
[Kelly 2006; Lin and Shen 2015; Mayo 2006; Netkachova et al. 2015; Palin and Habli 2010].
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Table 5. Specification and design patterns (behaviors and decompositions)
Specification/Design (qPattern) Refs. qA
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Safety contract 10 4 14 S pd * M
Safety concept (de)composition 2 3 4 6 S * * *
↪→ Parametric safety concept spec. 2 S *
Hardware platform reassignment 7 H Su
Hardware platform substitution 7 H Su
Process fusion 7 S Si
Distributed multiple indep. levels of security 5 1 * pd C fs Si M O S
Safety kernel 15 * pd Si S
Separated safety 13 * * Si S
↪→ Productive safety 13 *
↪→ Hardwired safety 13 H
↪→ Separated override 13 H O
↪→ De-energized override 13 H O
↪→ Safety limiter 13 H * *
M-out-of-N, multi-channel redundancy 8 7 12 11 * fo R V
↪→ Triple modular redundancy 7 12 11 H fo
↪→M-out-of-N-D 12 11 9 * fo M O
↪→ Homogeneous duplex, 2-ch. red. 7 12 11 H fo
↪→ Heterogeneous duplex 7 12 11 H fo D
↪→ Recovery block 7 12 11 S fo S * R
↪→ N-version-programming 12 11 S fo D
↪→ Acceptance voting 12 11 S fo S D V
↪→ N-self checking programming 12 11 S fo * D D
Actuation monitor 7 12 11 13 H fs *
↪→Watchdog, sanity/integrity check 7 12 11 H fs S O
↪→ 3-level safety monitoring 12 11 * fs * O
↪→ Protected single channel 7 12 11 * fs * O
Safety executive 12 11 H * S D O
Legend: ↪→. . .generalizes, * . . . generic, (S)oftware, (H)ardware, fo . . . fail-over/operational, fs . . . fail-safe/silent, pd . . . product-
based argument, pr . . . process-based argument, cm . . . compliance argument, cf . . . confidence argument, (C)ontract, (Su)ubstitution,
(Si)mplicity, (M)onitoring, (S)anity check, (R)eplication, (D)iversity, (R)epair, (D)egradation, (O)verride, (V)oting.
Discussion in, e.g. 1: [Althammer et al. 2008], 2: [Antonino and Trapp 2014], 3: [Antonino et al. 2015], 4: [Basir 2010], 5: [Cimatti
et al. 2015], 6: [Domis et al. 2009], 7: [Grunske 2003], 8: [Knight 2012], 9: [Littlewood and Rushby 2012], 10: [Oertel et al. 2014], 11:
[Preschern et al. 2013b], 12: [Preschern et al. 2013a], 13: [Rauhamäki et al. 2012], 14: [Sljivo et al. 2017], 15: [Wu et al. 2011]
2.5 qPattern: Which patterns are discussed?
The Tables 5 and 6 relate frequently discussed specifications, arguments, and designs with the
tactics they rely on. The tables contain information about the abstraction and whether the pattern
is associated with a behavioral constraint as explained in Section 1.1. We also indicate relationships
such as generalizes in Table 5 and supported-by in Table 6. We do not focus cases where one pattern
uses another one, for example, if a distributed architecture uses a safety kernel. However, readers
interested in further details about these and further relationships may consult the references given
in the tables, particularly, Palin and Habli [2010]; Preschern et al. [2013a]; Rauhamäki et al. [2012].
The following analysis addresses the questions qEngineering Step, qAbstraction, qCategory, and
qModel from Table 1. The column “References” in the Tables 5 and 6 recommends works providing
more detailed explanations of the listed patterns.
Specifications. Antonino and Trapp [2014] discuss the issue of inconsistencies between safety
concepts and architecture designs. It is difficult to keep assurance artifacts (e.g. as defined in
ISO 26262) up to date and safety concepts consistent with an evolving architecture. The authors
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Table 6. Argument patterns
Argument (qPattern) References qA
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Generic modules 17 18 24 14 1 * * ✓
Requirements (de)composition 4 23 28 3 S pd ✓ * *
↪→ Requirements formalization 4 S pd * *
↪→ Property-oriented 4 S pd *
↪→ Safety notion 4 S pd *
↪→ Calculate/convey/use 19 S pd * *
↪→ Interface safety (human-factors) 29 * pd *
Configurable architectures (prod. lines) 22 S pd ✓
Predefined safety requirements 28 * cm,cf *
↪→ Homologation or backing 28 * pr
Process compliance 20 S cm,pr
Product compliance 25 26 * cm,pd ✓
High-level vehicle safety 28 * * * * *
↪→ High-level SW safety 23 S pd *
↪→ SW contribution safety 23 32 S pd * * * *
↪→ SW safety requirements 23 2 3 S pd * * L
↪→ Argument justification SW 23 S cf
Risk management 28 21 * pr ✓
↪→ Safety goal valid 28 * cf *
↪→Minimization 28 * *
↪→ Alert and warning 28 * pr
↪→ Hazardous contrib. SW, risk mitig. 23 28 2 3 30 33 27 * * * * * * * D *
↪→ Hazard identification 28 21 * pr ✓
↪→ Failure-mode-effects analysis 28 16 * pr
Risk assessment 28 * pr
↪→ Safety assessment model adequate 31 * cf
Product defects, production errors 28 12 * *
Through life safety 28 * pr pr
Legend: ↪→. . . supported-by, similar patterns in the same row, see Table 5, pr . . . preventive, D . . . degradation, L . . . limiter.
Discussion in, e.g. see Table 5, 16: [Alexander et al. 2008], 17: [Denney et al. 2015], 18: [Despotou and Kelly 2008], 19: [Feather and
Markosian 2011], 20: [Gallina 2014], 21: [Gleirscher and Carlan 2017], 22: [Habli and Kelly 2010], 23: [Hawkins and Kelly 2009], 24: [Kelly
2006], 25: [Larrucea et al. 2016], 26: [Larrucea et al. 2017], 27: [Lin and Shen 2015], 28: [Palin and Habli 2010], 29: [Rich et al. 2007], 30:
[Sorokos et al. 2016], 31: [Sun et al. 2011], 32: [Weaver 2003], 33: [Yuan and Xu 2010]
propose (i) a safety concept decomposition pattern and (ii) parametrized safety concept specification
templates. An example of a power sliding door module illustrates their approach.
Antonino et al. [2015] propose a procedural pattern for decomposing safety requirements such
that traceability to an architectural design and a fault propagation model (i.e., fault trees) is
established to perform complete and consistent hazard mitigation. The authors describe traceability
between safety requirements, functional and technical architecture, and fault trees.
Oertel et al. [2014] investigate checking of safety requirements using formalized contracts (Sec-
tion 1.1) expressed through property patterns translated into LTL and applied in the VIS checker for
MatLab/Stateflow models. The authors determine fault combinations, injected into these models,
resulting in a contract violation and demonstrate this idea for an automotive light manager.
Decompositions (and Transformations). For a given decomposition, Grunske [2003] proposes trans-
formations for many of the software and hardware patterns listed in Table 5. These transformations
can be applied to a decomposition resulting in a safety-enhanced decomposition implementing
one or more of the principles, for example, substitution, checking, redundancy, recovery. These
principles aim at improving safety, that is, by reducing hazard probabilities. The transformations
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aim at handling three types of component faults: unavailability, faulty reactions, and timing devia-
tions. Grunske [2003] discusses patterns for fault avoidance and for fault containment (Table 5). He
proposes to refine these patterns with patterns for fault detection (i.e., watchdog, integrity check,
and the actuation monitor, see also [Rauhamäki et al. 2012]).
Rauhamäki et al. [2012] discuss hardware and software design patterns for control and safety
system development. They describe separated safety as their main pattern as well as productive
safety (a pattern for high-level safe system behavior), separated override, de-energized override, safety
limiter (a pattern for preventive safety actions), and hardwired safety. Each of the latter refines the
separated safety pattern (see Table 5). Rauhamäki et al. sketch structural and behavioral details
of their patterns. Of particular interest is their interdisciplinary discussion to capture reusable
knowledge beyond the domain of software design.
Preschern et al. [2013a] summarize decomposition patterns of fault-tolerant systems in safety-
critical applications. They identify safety tactics (Section 2.7) underlying each pattern, construct
product-based safety arguments to understand how the pattern implements these tactics (e.g.
replication redundancy), and establish relationships (e.g. is-similar-to, refines) between these
patterns. The patterns they discuss are listed in Table 5. A component model describes the design
underlying each pattern. Graphs represent the safety tactics. GSN diagrams convey arguments that
a specific pattern implements a specific safety tactic and, therefore, meets the top-level claim “the
system maintains its safety functionality” in an appropriate context.
Arguments. Hawkins and Kelly [2009] explore a way to establish confidence for software safety
arguments. They observe that certainty about claims made by a software safety argument cannot be
reached. However, sufficient confidence about these claims is required and assurance deficits arising
from uncertainties have to be made explicit (cf. [Kelly 1997]). The authors apply deviation-style
analysis (i.e., HazOp) to identify assurance deficits and determine importance and impact of each
deficit. They present five GSN patterns (cf. Table 6).
Palin and Habli [2010] describe how safety cases can justify automotive safety using a vehicle
safety argument and 12 low-level patterns (cf. Table 6). They combine their patterns using “supported
by” and “in context of” links. They apply their approach to an automotive start/stop system
instantiating the risk management argument and the risk mitigation argument patterns. Their
pattern catalog aims at the reuse of arguments and the integration of design and safety activities.
2.6 qAbstraction: Which technologies are abstracted by the patterns?
To understand the abstraction of the patterns and their applicability, we classify them into three
technology domains: software, electrical and electronic hardware, and mechanical hardware. Soft-
ware includes programs and data structures. Electrical and electronic hardware includes electrical,
electronic, and programmable electronic components (e.g. micro-processors, network and commu-
nication hardware, field-programmable gate arrays). Mechanical hardware includes, for example,
metal frameworks, hydraulics, and gear technology.
Models of safety concepts that abstract from several technology domains and coherently integrate
these domains are useful for the evaluation of safety with respect to the system perimeter (Sec-
tion 1.1.5). The range of technologies a model of a safety concept covers corresponds to the
abstraction available to reason about safety. In summary, multi-domain abstractions make it easier
to reason about safety as a behavioral constraint [Leveson 2012].
Several studies discuss their approaches by covering all three technology domains [Dardar et al.
2012; Denney and Pai 2013a; Gleirscher and Carlan 2017; Habli and Kelly 2010; Kehren et al. 2004;
Mahemoff et al. 2001; Mueller and D’Andrea 2012; Palin and Habli 2010; Rauhamäki and Kuikka
2015; Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Tan et al. 2009].
16 M. Gleirscher et al.
Table 7. qTactic: Selections of studies by general principle or tactic
Principle Selection of Studies
Fault detection /
condition monitoring
[Crenshaw et al. 2006; Delange et al. 2009; Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Liu et al. 2008; Palin
and Habli 2010; Saridakis 2002; Trindade et al. 2014]
Fault avoidance /
simplicity and
substitution
[Basir 2010; Delange et al. 2009; Grunske 2003; Mahemoff et al. 2001; Pont and Banner 2004;
Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2015]
Fault containment /
masking, redundancy,
recovery
[Armoush et al. 2008a; Baleani et al. 2003; Chen and May 2016; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2008;
Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Mahemoff et al. 2001; Mueller and D’Andrea 2012; Orlic 2007;
Palin and Habli 2010; Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2015; Saridakis 2002; Trindade et al. 2014]
Fail-safe [Baleani et al. 2003; Bozzano et al. 2013; Eloranta and Koskinen 2010; Gobbo and Mili 2001;
Knight 2012; Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Palin and Habli 2010; Preschern et al. 2014b,
2013a,b,c; Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Saridakis 2002]
Behavioral constraint [Crenshaw et al. 2006; Mueller and D’Andrea 2012; Rauhamäki et al. 2012; Sun et al. 2010;
Trindade et al. 2014]
Preventive safety [Crenshaw et al. 2006; Mueller and D’Andrea 2012; Palin and Habli 2010; Tan et al. 2009]
Passive safety [Flammini et al. 2014; Palin and Habli 2010]
Stabilization [Crenshaw et al. 2006; Eloranta and Koskinen 2010; Jain et al. 2012; Mueller and D’Andrea
2012; Rauhamäki et al. 2012]
The following investigations cover the classical technology domains considered in embedded
systems engineering, software and electrical and electronic hardware: [Armoush 2010; Baleani et al.
2003; Delange et al. 2009; Delmas et al. 2017; Domis et al. 2009; Kelly and McDermid 1998; Knight
2012; Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Miller et al. 2009; Pont and Banner 2004; Preschern et al. 2014b,
2013a,b,c; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2015; Trindade et al. 2014; Wu and Kelly 2004].
2.7 qTactic: Which tactics are incorporated by the patterns?
We classified the patterns according to tactic taxonomies. These taxonomies help relating depend-
ability principles as recommended by standards, for example, fault-tolerance measures in IEC 61508.
Motivated by such standards, Wu and Kelly [2004] elaborated a design tactic taxonomy later refined
by Preschern et al. [2013c]. Figure 2 arranges these and further tactics into an extended design
tactics taxonomy. Additionally, the taxonomy of argument patterns by Luo et al. [2016] distinguishes
product-based, process-based, compliance, and confidence arguments.
The following works include a comparison of fault avoidance, detection, and containment
principles: [Armoush 2010; Basir 2010; Knight 2012; Larrucea et al. 2016; Liu et al. 2008; Mahemoff
et al. 2001; Orlic 2007; Palin and Habli 2010; Preschern et al. 2014b, 2013a,b,c; Wu and Kelly 2004].
These studies helped us to validate the relationships in Figure 2. Table 7 points to studies for the
more general principles (framed in boxes in Figure 2).
2.8 qRelationship: How are the patterns and tactics related to each other?
Figure 2 depicts important relationships that generally hold between the tactics:
• Solid arcs indicate that one tactic fully realizes another tactic and dashed arcs that one tactic
partially realizes another tactic.
• Solid black arcs denote the generalizes relationship between the tactics inherited from Presch-
ern et al. [2013c]; Wu and Kelly [2004].
• Solid green arcs signify relationships identified as a result of the survey.
• Dashed black arcs indicate relationships that either include general principles or express
indicate multiple inheritance.
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Fig. 2. Overview of specification and design principles, comprising behavioral and decomposition tactics
• Solid red arcs describe relationships that we believe are important but remain unclear or less
clear from the surveyed studies.
• Tactics only connected with dashed arcs indicate generic principles independent of safety.
Figure 2 does not claim to present a complete set or orthogonal basis of tactics and relationships.
Decompositions, Behaviors, and Specifications. Table 5 lists studies providing an overview of
designs used in safety engineering. The column “Fail-safe/fail-over” indicates that designs are
related to general behaviors through the tactics they incorporate. However, missing from many
studies is a model (e.g. a state machine) describing the impact of the corresponding designs on
system-level properties (e.g. a behavioral constraint in form of a temporal logic formula).
If one of the designs in Table 5 is chosen to enhance a (component of a) system towards safety
then, during assurance, we need to be able to answer how the safety of this system is impacted by
this design. Given the terminology in Section 1.1.2, using such a design requires several claims to
be substantiated, for example, that the design improves the reliability of the system’s components,
that the design improves the reliability of the whole system, or that the design improves the safety
of the whole system. If these patterns can be represented by behaviors then they can be verified
against the safety specification.
As summarized in Figure 2 and accommodating Leveson’s framework, behavioral constraints
represent the most general tactic to represent safe states of systems in their operational environment.
This principle can be decomposed according to Figure 2, for example, into fault detection (e.g.
condition monitoring, limiters) and containment tactics (e.g. recovery).
Decompositions and Arguments. The fail-safe principle (Section 1.1.3) incoporates the ability of
a system to maintain or achieve a safe state in case of failure, for example, by shutting down the
system or certain functions of it (fail-silent) or by reconfiguring a systems’ internal operational state
(fail-operational). This principle can, for example, be realized by redundancy, recovery, masking,
and barrier. From the studies mentioned in Section 2.7, we know that condition monitoring is usually
combined with redundancy, recovery, and masking to design effective safety concepts.
Table 6 provides examples of argument patterns (e.g. decomposition arguments, argument
modules), classifies them according to their abstraction, their type [Luo et al. 2016], and whether
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their top-level claim contains a safety constraint (e.g. a contract). Furthermore, the table indicates
relationships to design tactics (e.g. passive and preventive safety).
Specifications and Arguments. Specification patterns support the specification of behavioral
constraints, particularly, safety contracts. Design patterns deal with the behavioral and structural
decomposition according to specific decomposition criteria (e.g. separation). Of interest to overall
safety—as indicated in Figure 1—is to establish the argument that the safety-enhanced design fulfills
the safety specification. For example, Sljivo et al. [2017] show, based on safety contracts, how
specifications and assurance arguments can be related and composed.
2.9 qContract: Which behaviors are guaranteed by the patterns?
The analysis in Figure 2 results in behavioral constraints usually being a combination of fail-
safety (both, fail-silent and fail-operational), prevention (e.g. by obstacle avoidance or emergency
braking), protection (e.g. by limiters or airbags), non-interference (e.g. by interlocking), and stabiliza-
tion (e.g. stability control of vehicle dynamics). The prevention (particularly, vigilance check and
obstacle avoidance) and limiter tactics usually cover mechanical hardware with their abstractions.
The safety specification may more or less directly refer to the risk class to be handled, for
example, behavioral hazards, undesired interference, and technical defects (cf. Section 2.2). If a
safety-enhanced decomposition integrates one of the patterns, we expect the behavior of this
decomposition to fulfill the safety specification.
Formal methods have proven to be very useful for the mathematical study of whether a design
fulfills a safety specification, that is, a specific behavioral constraint. Formal models of patterns
along this paradigm are discussed by Antonino et al. [2015]; Basir [2010]; Ebnenasir and Cheng
[2007]; Jackson [2001]; Jain et al. [2012]; Mueller and D’Andrea [2012]; Riera et al. [2014]; Sljivo
et al. [2017]; Sun et al. [2010]; Trindade et al. [2014].
2.10 qSecurity: How is security addressed in the studies?
Several of the surveyed works discuss security as a safety-critical system property, particularly,
undesired interactions between safety and security, hazardous influences of security on safety or
vice versa.
Property Specification. Relating security to other system properties, Knight [2012, Ch. 2.7.4]
observes that “security is inherently a composite” property whereas safety is discussed as a special
aspect of dependability dealing with technical defects with severe consequences. With their pattern,
Kajtazovic et al. [2014] suggest that contracts as a specification style can be used to specify
both safety and security properties. Radermacher et al. [2013] propose a meta-model facilitating
the assignment of security and safety properties to decomposition patterns. Mixed-criticality
encompasses interactions of safety and security, such as mentioned by Nicolas et al. [2017]. Asnar
et al. [2011] present a modeling and specification framework for security requirements that have to
be verified for safety-critical distributed information systems.
Computing Architecture and Technology. Zalewski [2001] explains possibilities of intrusion into a
control computer. Althammer et al. [2008] describe a distributed multi-level security architecture
and summarize how their approach realizes modular safety case construction including security
arguments. Wu et al. [2011] indicate how separation properties of a safety kernel are derived from
information system security mechanisms. Littlewood and Rushby [2012] justify that the monitoring
of 1-out-of-2 designs can indirectly mitigate consequences of certain security attacks. Larrucea
et al. [2015] discuss secure memory access in a commercial-off-the-shelf processor. Additionally,
Larrucea et al. [2016] support the combined handling of safety, security, and real-time aspects
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through separation mechanisms of a network-on-chip design pattern. Cimatti et al. [2015] describe
a fail-safe concept called fail-secure whose task is to bring a failed system to a state without enabling
security breaches. The authors demonstrate how their pattern can be automatically proven against
safety/security contracts. Nasser et al. [2017] exploit security attacks—for example, denial-of-service
and resource exhaustion—to introduce critical faults forcing a system into its safe state. Nasser et al.
observe that safety mechanisms are perfect attack surfaces for such attacks.
Moreover, investigations by Aven [2007]; Eames and Moffett [1999]; Novak and Gerstinger [2010]
suggest that undesired interactions can occur in both directions, i.e., security attacks can not only
create safety hazards but safety measures can also result in security vulnerabilities. Because of the
increasing complexity and connectivity of control software, such interactions could be reduced by
integrated safety/security concepts.
Engineering Process and Transformations. Hill and Victor [2008] consider security as a part of
the “Product Engineering Class” of their “software safety risk taxonomy.” Kreiner [2015] explains
an architecture management procedure applicable to handle both safety and security. Preschern
et al. [2014b] compare several safety development methods highlighting how three of them support
a combined view of safety and security: the “Safe Control Systems” method [Hauge and Stølen
2013], a method for the development of trusted applications for resource constrained embedded
systems [Hamid et al. 2013], and a method by the authors themselves [Preschern et al. 2013b]
as described later. Castellanos et al. [2013] present an approach to the transformation of a given
safety-critical architecture into a security-enhanced architecture. They demonstrate their approach
by transforming an architecture model such that separation properties are fulfilled.
Argumentation. Preschern et al. [2013b] extend their catalog of decomposition patterns (Table 5,
Preschern et al. [2013a]) by product-based security arguments that disclose how typical vulnerabili-
ties could threaten implementations of these decompositions. These arguments refine a generic
argument structured according to a security analysis of the decomposition. For demonstration, they
apply the STRIDE3 analysis [Shostack 2014] to identify threats using data flow diagrams and add
an argument against all identified threats. The authors explain their approach using a substation
automation device case study from the railway domain. This work integrates safety and security
by taking into account, at a pattern level, how security threats could negatively influence safety
properties.
Netkachova et al. [2015] describe an approach to identify interactions between security and
safety and to resolve conflicts leading to a security-informed safety case. Larrucea et al. [2017]
propose a modular argument for a mixed-criticality design pattern.
2.11 qModel: Which models are used to describe the patterns?
Table 8 lists studies according to the modeling paradigm (e.g. relational, propositional, transition
system) and the modeling language (e.g. UML, GSN) they use to present their approaches.
2.12 qContribution: To what extent are known challenges covered by the studies?
Inspired from discussions by Cant [2013]; Graydon [2015, 2017]; Knauss et al. [2017]; Langari and
Maibaum [2013]; Laplante et al. [2007], we comment on some practical challenges we expect to be
addressed by research on safety concepts and assurance cases.
2.12.1 Risk Identification and Classification. Near-injectivity of Risk Classifiers. Cant [2013, p. 4]
points to an issue with risk classifiers (Section 1.1.1) also well-known from other domains [Jarrett
3The STRIDE approach encompasses the techniques of Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of
services, and Elevation of privilege.
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Table 8. qModel: Selection of studies by modeling paradigm, formalism, and notation
Modeling Paradigm Selection of Studies
Relational (e.g. B, Z) [Delmas et al. 2017; Gobbo and Mili 2001; Sun 2014; Sun et al. 2010]
Propositional (e.g.
temporal logic)
[Basir 2010; Dias and Iyoda 2011; Kehren et al. 2004; Miller et al. 2009; Orlic 2007; Petroulakis
et al. 2016; Steiner and Rushby 2011; Sun et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2015; Trindade et al. 2014]
HOL (e.g. PVS, Maude) [Dias and Iyoda 2011; Steiner and Rushby 2011; Sun et al. 2010]
Transition system,
event structure (e.g.
AltaRica, Event-B)
[Ball and Butler 2009; Iliasov and Romanovsky 2008; Kabir and Goswami 2015; Kehren et al.
2004; Lin and Shen 2015; Lopez-Jaquero et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2009; Nasser et al. 2017; Orlic
2007; Pereverzeva et al. 2012; Randell 1975; Tan et al. 2015]
Petri net [Belli and Großpietsch 1991; Flammini et al. 2014]
Probabilistic (e.g.
Bayesian network)
[Armoush 2010; Armoush et al. 2008a; Bateman and Hatton 2006; Chen and May 2016;
Delmas et al. 2017; Denney et al. 2012; Kramer et al. 2012; Littlewood and Rushby 2012; Peng
and Zhiqiang 2013; Zeng et al. 2016]
Differential equation [Mueller and D’Andrea 2012]
Structure, flow
decomposition (e.g.
fault, signal, data,
material)
[Alho and Rauhamäki 2011; Armoush 2010; Armoush et al. 2008a; Baleani et al. 2003; Bozzano
et al. 2013; Delmas et al. 2015; Domis et al. 2009; Grunske 2003; Knight 2012; Liu et al. 2008;
Luo et al. 2017a; Mahemoff et al. 2001; Nasser et al. 2017; Natarajan et al. 2000; Pont and
Banner 2004; Preschern et al. 2014b, 2013c; Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2015; Rauhamäki et al.
2012; Tan et al. 2009]
Pattern meta-model,
tactic taxonomy
[Khalil et al. 2014; Luo et al. 2016; Preschern et al. 2013c; Radermacher et al. 2013; Vepsäläinen
and Kuikka 2014; Wu and Kelly 2004]
Modeling Language
UML [Fayad et al. 2003; Giuntini et al. 2017; Islam and Devarakonda 1996; Lopez-Jaquero et al. 2012;
Miller et al. 2009; Saridakis 2002]
AADL, EAST-ADL [Cadoret et al. 2012; Castellanos et al. 2013; da Penha et al. 2015; Delange et al. 2009; Oertel
et al. 2014]
ATL with OCL [Castellanos et al. 2013; Lin and Shen 2015]
Fault Trees [Antonino et al. 2015; Cimatti et al. 2015; Jaradat and Bate 2015; Sljivo et al. 2017; Sorokos
et al. 2016]
GSN [Basir 2010; Dardar et al. 2012; Denney and Pai 2013a,b; Gleirscher and Carlan 2017; Habli and
Kelly 2010; Kelly 2006; Kelly and McDermid 1998; Larrucea et al. 2016; Lin and Shen 2015; Luo
et al. 2016; Mayo 2006; Netkachova et al. 2015; Palin and Habli 2010; Preschern et al. 2013a,b;
Sljivo et al. 2017; Sorokos et al. 2016; Weaver 2003]
and Westcott 2010] of risk analysis: “different probability/severity pairs can be equated as having
the same level of risk.”4
We formally sketch this problem for the inclined reader: Let a,b : R with a < b, Ev the set of all
critical events, e ∈ Ev, Pr(e) : [0, 1] the probability of occurrence of e , Sev(e) : [a,b] a severity of
consequence measure for e , and a map RL : [0, 1]×[a,b] → N.5 Each natural number can be assigned
a set of directives for risk handling, for example, an automotive safety integrity level (SIL) according
to ISO 26262. RL encodes a domain-specific decision table that partitions the combinations of Pr
and Sev and maps e to the risk level according to this partitioning. A rather simple way of risk
classification, for example, sometimes used in FMEA, is to multiply Pr with Sev and map the result
into an ordered scale.
However, for n ∈ N, the inverse RL−1(n) can represent risk equivalence classes
{(p, s) | p ∈ [0, 1] ∧ s ∈ [a,b] ∧ RL(p, s) = n}
4In a former practical course on applying hazard analysis techniques [Gleirscher and Carlan 2017], our students raised this
issue as well.
5We require RL to range over a finite subset of N, that is, to represent a finite partition of [0, 1] × [a, b].
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being undesirably heterogeneous in their constitution, like pointed out by Cant [2013]. For two
fairly different risks of the same equivalence class, safety analysts could make similar decisions
about risk handling and safety engineers could follow similar directives for risk handling. Such
decisions and directives can involve, for example, the use of specific safety patterns and specific
parameters to instantiate these patterns. In the worst case, risks strongly differing in their Pr and
Sev values are handled using the same design and argument patterns where they should not. The
surveyed studies neither address this issue nor do they provide information on how often it occurs
in safety practice.
2.12.2 Risk Reduction and Assessment. Architecture Hardening, Integrity Level Decomposition. Haz-
ard analysis drives the choice and design of safety concepts, particularly, the enhancement of a
given system with instances of such concepts. As described above, hazard analysis includes risk
classification and the assignment of SILs to critical items, that is, the whole system or its functions,
channels, or components. SILs represent safety requirements to be fulfilled by such items. Conse-
quently, SIL assignment corresponds to specification, and demonstrating that an item achieves a
certain SIL corresponds to assurance argumentation. Standards such as ISO 61508 and ISO 26262
provide descriptions of SILs and, furthermore, suggest decomposition schemes for SILs according
to fault tolerance tactics (e.g. redundancy). This shows how safety requirements decomposition is
driven by certain tactics (Figure 2). Usually defined for electronic and mechanical hardware items,
some standards (e.g. IEC 61508) also provide SIL classifications for software items.
In this context, risk reduction involves two main questions: First, for architecture hardening,
given an item S known to have SIL x , does the transformation of S into SP using a decomposition
pattern P lead to a level xP of SP strictly higher than x? For example, Grunske [2003] and Delmas
et al. [2017] investigate the idea of transforming an architecture model by instantiating a safety
pattern and synthesizing a hardened architecture. Second, for integrity level decomposition, given
an item S assigned SIL x and decomposing S into S1 ⊗P S2 by applying a decomposition pattern P ,
can the SILs of S1 and S2 be reduced to levels x1 and x2 strictly lower than x? This last question
leads to assumptions to be made about the context of S and to requirements to be verified of S1 and
S2 and their composition by ⊗P .
Alignment of Risks with Safety Functions. System-level hazards are defined to have an impact on
the system’s environment. Whether or not such hazards are caused by component failure, studies
about behavior patterns discuss what Cant [2013] describes as “safety functionality in terms of
the system interface.” He states that “hazard analysis is inward-looking, making it hard to describe
safety functionality in terms of the system interface.” Certainly, hazard analysis should help with
the identification of safety requirements both at system and component level and with decisions
on the safety concepts to be used. We believe that hazard analysis based on behavior models can
improve the identification of safety requirements at the system interface and, thus, improve the
verification of the absence of system-level hazards. For example, Mahemoff et al. [2001] discuss
patterns capturing “safety-usability” for interface designs and Murugesan et al. [2015] elaborate an
extensible state machine pattern suitable for identifying and reducing mode confusions.
Certifiable Testing of High Automation. Knauss et al. [2017] empirically identify challenges
in automated vehicle testing, particularly, (i) the practical need of improved safety standards,
(ii) simple integrated models for deriving complete and sound test suites, and (iii) the avoidance of
re-certification. We extend their investigation with the impact of safety design patterns on these
challenges. For example, product-based argument patterns can be a complement to compliance
arguments backed by procedural standards (i), design patterns can simplify test suite decomposition
through reuse (ii) and, moreover, reduce the fragility of safety certificates (e.g. by argument modules
and by using the separation tactic; iii).
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Avoidance of Safety Antipatterns. Brown et al. [1998] discuss general antipatterns in software
engineering management and Laplante et al. [2007]; Laplante and Neill [2005] transfer these
ideas to various domains. For example, El-Attar and Miller [2006] apply antipatterns to software
specification based on use cases and Moha et al. [2012] apply antipatterns in architecture analysis.
However, we are unable to find studies identifying “worst practices” in a safety-related context.
2.12.3 Argumentation. Objectivity of Risk Analysis. To reduce confirmation bias in an argument,
Leveson [2011] proposes to negate the assurance claim. The integration of hazard analysis techniques
in the argumentation process can reduce this problem, for example, fault tree analysis (see, e.g.
Oertel et al. [2014]) helps to identify how an undesired top-level event could possibly occur and argue
from (reusable) countermeasures (see, e.g. Gleirscher and Carlan [2017]). The negated assurance
claim would require an iterative argumentation process with risk reduction after each iteration and
a corresponding update of the argument. This update would consist in the weakening of the claim
and the pruning of the evidence for the mitigated hazard from the argument. This process stops
if no further evidence for substantiating the negated claim can be found, the claim is ultimately
weakened, and all existing evidence has been removed.
Enrichment of Process-based Arguments by Product-based Arguments. Graydon et al. [2007] pro-
pose the on-the-fly construction of assurance evidence during development. Other studies discuss
traceability (i) between evidence and assurance claims by building safety arguments from architec-
ture models and component fault trees [Domis et al. 2009; Sorokos et al. 2016] and (ii) between
counter-evidence and assurance claims by obstructing safety arguments through fault injection
and propagation and obtaining fault trees from computed cut-sets [Oertel et al. 2014]. Basir [2010]
attaches meaning to assurance arguments by using natural deduction and, this way, indicates how
inconsistencies during integration of evidence can be disclosed by theorem proving.
Validity of Assurance Assumptions and Models.Argument confidence (e.g. completeness, soundness)
is relying on the validity of the models of the system under argumentation and its environment
and on the chosen abstraction. Sun et al. [2011] demonstrate how to justify the validity of hazard
analysis results to be employed in an argument. In the maintenance of safety-critical electronic
hardware (i.e., prognostics and health management), Zio [2016] discusses opportunities of using
data from hardware health monitoring sensors for the assessment and usage of predictive models.
Unambiguity, Soundness, and Completeness of Arguments. Formalization is known for the reduction
of ambiguities, the support of automation, and the evaluation of consistency of claims. However,
it is still unclear whether [Rushby 2010] or not [Graydon 2015], and to what extent formalism in
arguments can increase their confidence. In any case, the contract templates from Antonino and
Trapp [2014] could be formalized and assessed against completeness criteria. Luo et al. [2017b]
present a tool for confidence assessment of arguments (based on degree-of-beliefs) without the
necessity of having a formal design model of the system. Their approach seems useful in the
construction of abstract arguments to be re-assessed once such models are available.
Readability, Reduction of Complexity, and Maintainability of Arguments. For example, Despotou
and Kelly [2008] and Kelly [2006] apply decomposition criteria from architecture design to mod-
ularize assurance arguments. While GSN has been standardized and shown to be useful for the
representation of arguments (Section 2.11), Denney and Pai [2013a, 2016] and Matsuno [2014]
provide formalizations of the GSN syntax to support composable GSN-based patterns and to support
automated consistency checking for argument construction and maintenance. We believe, their
decomposition and consistency checking could make use of behavior models of the system under
argumentation. This was shown in goal-oriented and model-based requirements engineering (e.g.
[van Lamsweerde 2009]) and in contract-based software and systems engineering (e.g. [Broy 2011;
Meyer 1992]). Studies such as, for example, Armoush [2010]; Basir [2010]; Orlic [2007]; Sun et al.
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[2010] also discuss this direction. Overall, correctness proofs based on behavior models could help
justify the decomposition of the corresponding GSN arguments. Using behavior models with formal
contracts would allow arguments to scale up to the assurance of large systems.
3 DISCUSSION
The Sections 3.1 to 3.7 present our findings and suggestions for future research based on the survey
results. In Section 3.8, we discuss validity threats from literature search and systematic mapping
with a potential impact on the quality of this survey and describe our measures to minimize these
threats. Section 3.9 summarizes our experiences with the survey method.
3.1 Findings and Suggestions from Systematic Mapping
The applications discussed in the studies cover many areas of safety-critical embedded control
systems. Patterns are presented at different stages during the system life cycle ranging from early-
stage requirements engineering (e.g. [Stålhane and Myklebust 2016]) and architectural design (e.g.
[Rupanov et al. 2012]) down to implementation and assurance. Several studies capture at least
three of the four engineering steps we distinguish. Of all categories, our survey targets design (i.e.,
behavior, decomposition) and argument patterns. Particularly, the surveyed decomposition patterns
cover the whole range of tactics from fault avoidance (“correct by design”) and fault detection to
fault containment, however, with a clear focus on checking, recovery, and redundancy.
Notations like UML, GSN, and generic component diagrams appear most frequently in the
presentations of the concepts. GSN dominates the studies and is discussed as an intuitive way of
visualizing arguments. Formalism is rarely used in the studies to assess the concepts.
Overall, we found interesting research towards a solution of each of the listed challenges.
However, risk classification, integrity level decomposition, and the identification of antipatterns
were discussed the least among the surveyed studies. Only few of the works present validations
and practical evaluations based on empirical and formal results.
The surveyed works cover many of the internationally relevant venues for design patterns and
for dependability engineering.
We strongly encourage the use of a structured abstract and a standard document template.
Document templates used in the studies helped us to evaluate the described patterns and relate
them to each other. Templates can also be a first step towards formalization.
3.2 Towards a Unified Pattern System
Relationships between design patterns have, for example, been elaborated by Preschern et al. [2013c].
From the studies, we identified further relationships between design and argument patterns as
shown in the Tables 5 and 6.
Several patterns facilitate the abstraction from software, hardware, and mechanical aspects.
However, the level of abstraction used in the studies varies strongly. Moreover, the studies suggest
that there are several related notions of safety. Formal models would allow the comparison of these
notions. Without formalization, relationships (e.g. similarity, equivalence, refinement) between the
patterns as well as the meaning of their composition remains unclear.
For example, an integration of the approaches of Rauhamäki et al. [2012] and Sljivo et al. [2017]
would require unified notions of a safety function, a safe state, and relationships between the
presented patterns. Beyond the identified relationships, refinements between design-time (e.g.
hardware platform substitution) and run-time (e.g. multi-channel redundancy with voting) fault
prevention [Grunske 2003] could help bridging important reasoning steps in assurance arguments.
The many country-specific signaling/interlocking practices in the railway domain further motivate
unification. Because railway regulation is also accident driven [Havârneanu et al. 2015], relating
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these practices and deriving a hierarchy of interlocking patterns could even lead to an exchange of
lessons learned (from train accidents) between those countries.
To improve the comparability and unification of patterns, they could be modeled in a common
formal framework, for example, based on relations [Stepney et al. 2003] or temporal logic [Dwyer
et al. 1999]. Such a formal basis could help clarifying and establishing new pattern relationships,
such as inheritance, to elaborate pattern variants, and establish proof hierarchies (e.g. envisaged
in Marmsoler and Gleirscher [2017]).
3.3 From Tactic Taxonomies to Proof Systems
Tactic taxonomies can be seen as a first step towards a theory of safety concepts. Such a theory
could bridge the gap between decomposition tactics [Preschern et al. 2013c; Wu and Kelly 2004] and
argumentation tactics [Luo et al. 2016] and comprise a framework for the construction of verifiable
safety arguments. According to Rushby’s classification of critical properties [Rushby 1994, 2010], a
taxonomy can foster reuse in the verification of how safety design patterns contribute to safety. A
taxonomy can, moreover, identify the role these patterns play in high-confidence argumentation.
Many of the decomposition patterns are also known as reliability patterns. Data in Gleirscher
and Nyokabi [2018] suggests that practitioners are aware of the subtle differences between safety
and reliability. This distinction has not been rigorously clarified in the studies, including the pattern
catalogs [Grunske 2003; Preschern et al. 2013a]. However, in Section 1.1.8, we distinguish between
safety as a strong property and reliability as a weaker, more general property.
Safety, reliability, and security can be formulated as behavioral properties of a system, as explained
in Section 1.1.7. Hence, a framework based on Figure 2 would be helpful to verify how safety-
enhanced designs fulfill a given set of behavioral constraints, that is, a safety specification (Figure 1).
Inspired from discussions by Broy [2011] and Rushby [2011], verification results (e.g. safety
integrity level or, more generally, property decomposition and preservation) could be lifted to the
pattern level and, this way, form a pattern-based proof system.
3.4 Argumentation by Contract Verification
The view of safety as a behavioral property (Section 1.1.1) not necessarily related to system failure
is rarely discussed in the studies. In the light of safety as a behavioral property [Leveson 2012],
many of the design patterns we surveyed are missing a corresponding contract (Section 1.1.3) that
allows to reason [Rushby 2010, 2011] about how a design impacts safety and reduces hazards.
Instead, safety often seems to stay implicit in a pattern application.
For the construction of high-confidence arguments, the use of behavior models could help
connect designs and arguments. Moreover, formal models could be used to clarify the semantics
of certain parts of arguments. For example, the work by Basir [2010] shows a fruitful connection
between theorem proving and argument construction. Moreover, we believe that the definition of
contracts for patterns is necessary for successful reuse and the construction of high-confidence
arguments. For example, for safety mechanisms in automotive engineering, mechatronics, and
robotics (e.g. anti-lock braking systems, vigilance checks [Hirata and Murakami 2014; Lin and
Lin 2011; Utsumi et al. 2013]), it can be useful to have property specifications (e.g. contracts) as
assurance claims.
A fail-safe system is required to not create a hazard on the occurrence of covered failures. What
does that mean? What is the considered system perimeter? Can we deduce from a model that
failure consequences have actually been covered beyond the requirements? Can we deduce safety
of a system in the failed state from this model? We could, for example, do so using a contract that
specifies the weakest context. But how much do we need to know about this context to specify
safety requirements in form of safety contracts?
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Many of the design patterns based on the fail-safe and fail-over tactics (Table 5) model decom-
positions that can be characterized by a corresponding behavior. In fact, some designs combine
decomposition and behavior, for example, the “distributed multiple independent levels of security”
design is formally modeled and verified against a contract as demonstrated in [Cimatti et al. 2015].
Moreover, Dong et al. [2003] show the possibility of design patterns to be associated with contracts
inducing expressions in Milner’s Calculus of Communicating Systems [Milner 1995].
Furthermore, contracts with violation handling (i.e., specifications with assumptions on the
environment) could allow critical contract violations to be handled by weakening contracts and
instantiating corresponding pairs of patterns and contracts.
This way, the instantiation of a safety pattern for a system can address a violation
of the assumption of a contract (e.g. a failure mode of the environment) or a
violation of the guarantee of a contract (e.g. a failure mode of the system).
Contracts with violation handling as, for example, formalized by Broy [2011], can get highly
important when system (of systems) complexity boosts latent systematic defects.
3.5 Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment
It is important to keep track of how low-level hazard analysis impacts design decisions for the
overall system and how system-level hazard analysis drives low-level design decisions. Because risk
priorities correspond to integrity levels and integrity levels motivate the choice of decompositions,
the issue of homogeneous risk classifiers is worthy to be further explored at a pattern level. Injective
risk classifiers of the type RL : Ev → N could aid in more distinctive risk handling by providing
information about the type of risk beyond just Pr and Sev for classification.
Related to risk classification is the treatment of critical properties of different nature, for example,
security and safety, usability and safety, or usability and security. Such properties are usually
allocated to various overlapping fragments of a system. Particularly, if interaction cannot be
handled by conservative forms of physical separation, the avoidance or handling of undesired
interactions between these system fragments forms a safety requirement.
Finally, formalism could also provide evaluation criteria for argument patterns, for example, to
identify confirmation bias. For learning from failure, a stronger integration of incident and accident
research [Havârneanu et al. 2015] as recommended by Leveson [2012] seems necessary to report
on antipatterns and to improve existing safety concepts.
3.6 Tools Support for Pattern Systems
Verification frameworks could benefit from process and tool support based on patterns and sup-
port safety engineering as an integral part of the system life cycle. The integration with widely
known system models and formalisms (particularly, to address cross-disciplinarity) could improve
automated construction, semantics-based checking and verification, and maintenance of assurance
results. Such approaches would offer tool support for analyzing risk, determining safety integrity
levels and, for architecture hardening at scale.
The relationship between assurance arguments [Palin and Habli 2010] and requirements trace-
ability is discussed by Antonino et al. [2015]; Sljivo et al. [2017]. Beyond traceability models, support
for automated traceability is desirable in the construction and maintenance of arguments from
evidence (e.g. implementation and verification of countermeasures) towards claims (e.g. system
safety requirements).
26 M. Gleirscher et al.
3.7 Empirical Assessment and Standardization of Pattern Use
Although safety patterns represent “best practices” or “proven-in-use” concepts, we do not know
whether the discussed patterns fulfill the predicates “best” or “proven.” The examples, case studies,
experience reports, and discussions studied help with understanding the approaches and suggest
these predicates hold of decomposition patterns more than of argument patterns.
The standard IEC 61508 (part 4) defines proven in use for an element as the demonstration
“... that the likelihood of dangerous systematic faults is low enough so that every safety
function that uses the element achieves its required safety integrity level.”
Ehrenberger [2016] and Schäbe and Braband [2015] discuss the application of stochastic models
(here, Poisson processes as proposed by Littlewood [Littlewood 1991]) in the transfer of reliability
characteristics between different contexts. Consistently, the standards ISO 26262, IEC 61508, and
ISO 61511 refer to techniques such as “field monitoring” to collect statistical evidence for arguments
of items to be reused in certification.
For the transfer of the “proven in use” concept to the field of argument patterns, it can be
helpful to evaluate how and where the surveyed argument patterns have been practiced and
declared as fit for reuse in certification. For this, a database using the structure of Kajtazovic et al.’s
approach could be used to register “system elements out of context” (cf. ISO 26262) or other reusable
system components. For each item in the database, the contract could store safety properties and a
decomposition.
Furthermore, the inclusion of formal safety patterns for specification, design, and assurance
in industrial standards could guide the representation of all safety stakeholders’ expectations
on argument confidence. For example, the design patterns to cover random faults in electronic
hardware components in IEC 61508 Parts 2 and 7 (diagnostic techniques and measures) could be
extended by corresponding argument and specification patterns.
The relatively low number of validation, evaluation, and experience studies hampers successful
knowledge transfer between industry and academia. Although the studies convey interesting results,
some studies are, thus, difficult to replicate and transfer. Hence, we stress the necessity to collect
evidence on pattern applications from further application domains (e.g. robotics and intelligent
autonomous systems) and in form of validation and evaluation works, preferably, controlled
experiments using formal methods.
GSN-based assurance cases [Hawkins and Kelly 2009] have received a lot of attention by re-
searchers leading to a body of knowledge ready to be empirically assessed, further integrated with
research from other fields (e.g. formal methods, software engineering, reliability engineering), and
further transferred into assurance practice (e.g. through stronger inclusion in standards). These
observations confirm and generalize Graydon’s [Graydon 2015] question of sufficient evidence on
the quality, properties, and practical effectiveness of formal assurance arguments.
3.8 Limitations of the Survey
Our search was focused on patterns, concepts, measures, and mechanisms in the design and
assurance of safety-critical systems. The ambivalent meanings of the words “pattern” and “safety”
lead to many search results across many domains and disciplines. Differences in the search engines
first required us to relax and then constrain the search expressions. For example, we pruned the
results by excluding the terms “food, medic, bio, service-oriented architecture, SOA, web.” Moreover,
we exclude gray literature and non-peer reviewed literature, but include peer-reviewed and archived
literature from the same authors if available. However, we reduced the risk of missing relevant work
and outdated search results by snowballing6 and an update of our search. We eliminate inaccuracies
6Manually picking studies from bibliographies of selected key studies.
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during data extraction, coding, and analysis by discussion, redundant extraction and coding, and
cross-checking data samples.
3.9 Experiences with Systematic Mapping and Review
Systematic literature reviews [Kitchenham 2007] are intended to help with the comparison of
similar studies (e.g. replication studies) in a very specific research field and with identifying new
research directions in this field.
In our cross-disciplinary case, the effort of a systematic review to compare heterogeneous studies
and to identify interesting research directions was too high to justify its benefit. Our main findings
could have been identified more easily by relying on one or two databases instead of four and
by snowballing. We thus confirm the drawback of high costs as mentioned by Shull et al. [2008,
p. 352]. Database search and filter turned out to be a weak instrument for the control of the survey
process to quickly converge in a complete selection of coherent studies. Search terms can play a
minor role in identifying relevant literature as the search can get unnecessarily wide in case of
many synonyms and biased in case of missing synonyms.
From four databases and from duplicate removal, we observe that the gain in relevant studies
diminishes with the addition of a third and fourth database. Our experience suggests that after an
initial search in one (or two) database(s), traditional manual snowballing seems to be most effective
and can be supported by tools7 and by specific search queries. We have however not taken into
account the simplifications for systematic reviews recommended by Kuhrmann et al. [2017].
The most difficult parts in exploring the literature of a cross-disciplinary field is the identification
of an interesting set of survey questions. Such questions typically arise from the review process
and often require changes of the search string because new concepts and terms have to be taken
into account. This issue necessitates search iteration and strengthens the case for snowballing.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this survey, we summarize and evaluate research on reusable design and argumentation concepts
for the assurance of system safety. We present relationships between these concepts and derive
suggestions for future research. Our work is based on a systematic map to reduce bias, validate
search criteria and databases, to track inclusion and exclusion criteria, and to support reproducibility.
We identify a range of reusable concepts. Most of these concepts can be related to the overall
aim of not violating safety constraints. The difficulty of effective reuse of these concepts still
sustains with the problem that the various notions of system safety are not well integrated. The
most relevant notion defines safety as a set of behavioral constraints to be fulfilled by the system
when operated in its environment. Additionally, safety of a system in operation depends on the
various properties of this system’s components. Hence, a reusable safety concept needs to explain
how it, when applied in a specific context, provably contributes to the system’s safety. However,
heterogeneous formalisms hamper the comparison of the concepts across the surveyed studies.
The construction of high-confidence assurance arguments requires precise semantics of these
concepts for the analysis of their relationships and for the verification of their composition. Safety
concepts could be modeled as pairs of design patterns and safety contracts to facilitate compositional
verification of their use, that is, of their instantiation. Studies using formal (e.g. probabilistic) models
of these concepts are most promising to meet assurance proof obligations of this kind.
To improve this situation, we identified three interesting research directions: First, the establish-
ment of a body of knowledge unifying the concepts shared between safety assurance, dependability
and security engineering, human factors engineering, and system accident research. Second, the
7See, for example, https://openknowledgemaps.org/ or https://www.semanticscholar.org.
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formulation of reusable concepts in a common semantic framework. Third, the transfer of this
body of knowledge into engineering practice to evaluate the effectiveness of these concepts and
gain feedback for research progress.
Future Work. Our survey could be extended for discussing safety and security. Hence, a repetition
of our study for security patterns could balance our safety perspective by a security perspective.
A similar survey on “security patterns” could help to develop an integrated view of security and
safety [Steiner and Liggesmeyer 2013].
An interesting direction for the development of an improved safety pattern system could be
a survey of safety-related antipatterns. This step might have to go along with empirical studies
of system safety practice and could take into account more general work on design “patterns”
“templates”, “models,” “types”, “forms”, “tactics”, or “styles”. The survey of gray literature could take
into account unpublished but open material from industrial practice.
An extension of the presented tactic taxonomy could be facilitated by additional studies on
the reuse of designs and arguments in, for example, robotics and intelligent autonomous systems,
public infrastructure automation, building automation in civil engineering, production automation,
naval systems, and control systems in construction machinery and utility vehicles.
The classification in Pont and Banner [2004, p. 208] could help with a refined analysis of the
questions qPattern, qCategory, qTactic, and qRelationship for software implementation patterns.
The authors distinguish between patterns for software foundations, time-triggered architecture for
single/multi-processor systems, user-interface components, serial-peripheral library, monitoring
and control components, and hardware foundations.
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A NOMENCLATURE
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Table 9. Important abbreviations used in this article
AADL Architecture Analysis and Design Language
(A)SIL (Automotive) Safety Integrity level
ATL Atlas Transformation Language
EAST-ADL EAST Architecture Description Language
ETA Event Tree Analysis
FFA Functional Failure Analysis
FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
HazOp Hazard Operability (studies)
HOL Higher Order Logic
IMA Integrated Modular Avionics
LTL Linear Temporal Logic
OCL Object Constraint Language
PVS Prototype Verification System
RE Requirements Engineering
SC Safety Concept
SE Software Engineering
STRIDE Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege
UML Unified Modeling Language
